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 Abstract 
This paper shows the political investment risk in the Russian regions. The political risk has 
been determined by an index system. The value of each of the 19 indices is fixed individually 
for all 89 Russian regions. As a result all indices are classified and rated (Euclidean score). 
The result features six regions with a favourable political climate and twelve regions with a 
relatively favourable political climate. Most of them are found in the western part of the country. 
The political climate of 67 Russian regions varies between undetermined and rather unstable. 
This result is not surprising. Two regions, both border regions, have an unfavourable political 
climate, one region, a border region, too, is very unstable and the political climate in the 
Chechen Republic is menacing. 
Zusammenfassung 
Diese Studie zeigt die politischen Investitionsrisiken in den russischen Regionen auf. Das 
politische Risiko wird anhand eines Indikatorsystems erfaßt. Der Wert eines jeden der insge-
samt 19 Indikatoren wird für alle 89 russischen Regionen einzeln ermittelt. Über eine Klassifi-
zierung werden die einzelnen Regionen verglichen, und es wird ein Ranking ermittelt 
(Euklidsche Wertung). 
Im Ergebnis weisen sechs Regionen ein günstiges und zwölf Regionen ein relativ günstiges 
politisches Klima auf. Sie befinden sich mehrheitlich im westlichen Zentrum des Landes. 
Zwischen unbestimmt und recht instabil bewegt sich das politische Klima in 67 russischen 
Regionen. Dieses Ergebnis stellt keine Überraschung dar. Zwei Regionen, die beide Grenz-
regionen sind, haben ein ungünstiges politisches Klima, eine Region – ebenfalls eine Grenz-
region – gilt als sehr instabil und die Republik Tschetschenien weist ein bedrohliches politi-
sches Klima auf. 
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1. Development of Russian Regions 
Meanwhile it is no secret any more that Russia is more than its big capital Moscow. Russia is 
a patchwork of very different regions which are different in tradition, ethnic, and culture. 
Officially, the so-called Russian Federation is a federation of 89 regions. Since December 
1993, when the new Russian constitution was accepted, these regions have begun to develop 
in very different ways.  
According to their constitution the regions are defined as federal subjects. They are 
administrative units with unequal rights. The asymmetric federalism gives the republics more 
autonomy than the regions (oblate). But the constitution is only one side of Russian real life. 
The short history of regional development in Russia shows that for real self-governance the 
political and economic power of the regional administration counts. The rules of the constitution 
are more or less secondary. The best example for this argument are the power-sharing 
agreements between the Moscow government and 23 regional administrations.  
The agreements define the power of the center and the regions in several political fields as well 
as in the economy. In fact, they gave the regions more latitude to act in their own sense. 
Particularly in the case of the budget autonomy and tax laws, in regional foreign trade, and in 
international political relations the region have got more rights. Through the power-sharing 
agreements the Russian center successfully tried to stop secessionary tendencies in the 
regions. But at the same time the agreements are responsible for the ongoing economic dif-
ferentiation in the Russian Federation. 
Between autumn 1996 and spring 1997 in all federation subjects the heads of the regional ad-
ministration were elected. Within the framework of the election the head of the regional admini-
stration was renamed as governor (in territories) or president (in republics). The direct impact of 
the central government on the democratically legitimated governor or president became less. 
The central government has no more any right to dismiss the political leaders in the regions. 
The results of the governor's elections show that beside the reformers and the conservatives 
the pragmatical, regional politicians became more important. In the regions the political 
executive dominates political life. In a lot of cases the decision making is concentrated in the 
person of the governor or president and his team. 
Russia may now point out a some-year-old experience in democratic elections. In December 
1993 and 1995 the parliament has been elected. In summer 1996 Mr. Boris Yeltsin has been 
re-elected through presidential elections. In spite of this good start, democracy has not been 
anchored all over the large country. Especially in the regions interest groups with – several 
legal and illegal interests – have a large impact on the decision-making process. Some times 
bureaucratical arbitrariness, little chance to enforce laws and acts, high crime rates, threat-
ening social upset or ethnical conflicts might be negative for the political and economic de-
2 — Mögel / Political Risk in Russian Regions — I H S 
 
velopment in the Russian regions. The future of the Russian regions depends on their political 
stability. 
2. Method to Measure the Political Risk 
The term "political risk" means the (negative) deviation of the results of an economic activity 
from the expected results in the case that not the partner but the political unstability in the 
country of the partner has caused the deviation. Together with the "economic risk" the "political 
risk" defines the country risk. In the international credit business it is quite common to take the 
political risk for the country risk. 
Basically, there is a difference between the political risk for banks and. credit institutes re-
spectively and for industry: For credit rating the government's solvency and future willingness to 
pay are vital (converting risk, transfer risk, non-payment risk, moratorium risk). Industrial 
enterprises, however, are directly afflicted by the deterioration of the investment climate in their 
partner's country. Enterprises have to manage the risk of loss caused by the political situation. 
Foreign direct investment (FDI) is based on the analysis of the political risk of a country. 
Analyses are necessary to find out the optimal country for investment, to bargain with the 
government of the foreign country, to estimate the capital costs, to get a base for decision-
making and efficiency evaluation of a done investment. 
The transfer of the abstract term to a manageable instrument for analysis demands a catego-
risation of the indices of possible political risks. After D. Simon three criteria have to be cate-
gorised into:  
1. Micro- and macropolitical risks, 
2. intern and/or extern risks, and  
3. governmental and social risks.1  
Macropolitical risks concern all enterprises while micropolitical risks concern only some enter-
prises. Intern risks are the consequence of regional and local events and actors. Extern risks 
are caused by extern actors. Governments, administrations, and social actors can give rise to 
governmental and social risks. 
The indices (see chapter 4) were created as simple as possible. It was tried to differ them from 
each other as much and as exactly as possible. But politics are never static. They continue to 
develop and indices for the political risk may not be completely independent, but reflecting 
different phases of political development.  
                                                                                                                                                                                        
1See: Benmansour, H./Vadcar, C. (1995): Le risque politique. Dans le nouveau contexte international, Paris, p. 23. 
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With all indices the political risk in the Russian regions may be covered. The indices show the 
deviation from the expected path of development. "Zero" means there is no deviation and the 
development is favourable. Ten points rate a significantly undesirable development. As a result, 
all indices are classified and rated (Euclidean score). 
The indices of the three categories have been rated in the relation 2:1:2. The sum of the micro- 
and macropolitical risks and the governmental and social risks weighs as double as the sum of 
the intern and/or extern risks. The probability of micro- and macropolitical risks as well as gov-
ernmental and social risks draws the picture of the (future) political structure of a state. 
Therefore, it seems to be reasonable to rate these risks higher than the intern and/or extern 
risks. The last one can be described as final or resulting risks, too. 
3. Results: Political Risks in Russian Regions 
An overview of all regions and indices can be found in table A-3 (Appendix). The results had 
been aggregated and classified into seven classes (table 3.1).  
On the first glance the political climate in the Russian federal subjects is mainly undetermined 
or even rather unstable. Most of the Russian regions belong to these two classes. On the other 
side, there are 18 regions with good political conditions for foreign investors. 
Table 3.1: Political climate in Russian regions 
Class Political climate Number of regions 
1 favourable  6  
2 relatively favourable 12 
3 undetermined 30 
4 rather unstable 37 
5 unfavourable  2 
6 very unstable 1 
7 menacing 1 
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The result features six regions with a favourable political climate. Most of them are found in the 
western part of the country. Beside the two Russian main cities – Moscow and St. Petersburg 
– the reform-oriented Nizhny Novgorod Region is on the very top of the ranking list. Other top 
regions are the Kamchatka Region (Far East), the Moscow Region, and the Tver Region.  
Rather good political conditions are to be found in twelve Russian regions. They are the 
Samara Region (Volga), the Republic Karelia (Northern), the Altai Territory (West Siberia), the 
Arkhangelsk Region (Northern), the Jewish A. R. (Far East), the Adygei Republic (Northern 
Caucasus), the Belgorod Region (Black Earth), the Sverdlovsk Region (Ural), the Kostroma 
Region (Centr), the Orel Region (Centr), the Kalmyk Republic (Volga), and the Leningrad 
Region (North-western). 
The majority of Russian federal subjects (76 regions) belong to the classes "undetermined" or 
"rather unstable" political climate. This result is not surprising. It corresponds to the general 
opinion about the political situation in Russia.  
Two regions, both border regions, have an unfavourable political climate. These are the Amur 
Region (Far East) and the Pskov Region (Estonian border). One class, composed of the 
Maritime (Primorsky) territory in the Far East and of the Chechen Republic in the Northern 
Caucasus, the political climate is very unstable and menacing respectively. 
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Table 3.2: Regional rating score of political risks in Russian regions 
Pos. Region name  Score Class.  Pos. Region name  Score Class. 
1 Moscow  0,00 1  46 Orenburg Reg. 3,21 3 
2 St. Petersburg 0,01 1  47 Tomsk Reg. 3,27 3 
3 Nizhny Novgorod Reg. 0,18 1  48 Kaluga Reg. 3,34 3 
4 Kamchatka Reg. 0,19 1  49 North Ossetian Republic 3,62 4 
5 Moscow Reg. 0,37 1  50 Omsk Reg. 3,65 4 
6 Tver Reg. 0,45 1  51 Ust'-Orda Buryar A.T.  3,69 4 
7 Samara Reg. 0,98 2  52 Penza Reg. 3,78 4 
8 Republic Karelia 0,99 2  53 Murmansk Reg. 3,81 4 
9 Altai Territory 1,11 2  54 Tyumen Reg. 3,82 4 
10 Arkhangelsk Reg. 1,51 2  55 Tuva Republic 3,85 4 
11 Jewish A.R. 1,51 2  56 Nenetz A.T.  3,89 4 
12 Adygei Republic 1,52 2  57 Kirov Reg. 3,98 4 
13 Belgorod Reg. 1,65 2  58 Komi-Permyak A.T.  4,09 4 
14 Sverdlovsk Reg. 1,65 2  59 Rostov Reg. 4,11 4 
15 Kostroma Reg. 1,67 2  60 Kurgan Reg. 4,17 4 
16 Orel Reg. 1,70 2  61 Altai Republic 4,19 4 
17 Kalmyk Republic 1,86 2  62 Bashkortostan Republic 4,20 4 
18 Leningrad Reg. 1,88 2  63 Sakhalin Reg. 4,24 4 
19 Novosibirsk Reg. 2,10 3  64 Yaroslavl Reg. 4,26 4 
20 Mariy El Republic 2,16 3  65 Koryak A.T.  4,34 4 
21 Lipetsk Reg. 2,16 3  66 Ivanovo Reg. 4,37 4 
22 Novgorod Reg. 2,18 3  67 Udmurt Republic 4,42 4 
23 Volgograd Reg. 2,19 3  68 Taymyr A.T.  4,46 4 
24 Tatarstan Republic 2,35 3  69 Karachai-Cherkess Republic 4,52 4 
25 Krasnoyarsk Territory 2,44 3  70 Republic Mordovia 4,55 4 
26 Saratov Reg. 2,47 3  71 Republic Dagestan 4,76 4 
27 Ryazan Reg. 2,59 3  72 Yamalo-Nenetz A.T.  4,78 4 
28 Irkutsk Reg. 2,66 3  73 Khanty-Mansi A.T.  4,87 4 
29 Voronezh Reg. 2,67 3  74 Buryat Republic 4,88 4 
30 Kabardino-Balkar Republic 2,68 3  75 Perm Reg. 5,00 4 
31 Kemerovo Reg. 2,77 3  76 Ulyanovsk Reg. 5,06 4 
32 Smolensk Reg. 2,84 3  77 Bryansk Reg. 5,08 4 
33 Krasnodar Territory 2,86 3  78 Chita Reg. 5,09 4 
34 Astrakhan Reg. 2,86 3  79 Chukot A.T.  5,14 4 
35 Komi Republic 2,88 3  80 Sakha (Yakut) Republic 5,32 4 
36 Aginski Buryat A.T.  2,94 3  81 Chelyabinsk Reg. 5,33 4 
37 Magadan Reg. 2,99 3  82 Khabarovsk Territory 5,35 4 
38 Tula Reg. 2,99 3  83 Kursk Reg. 5,43 4 
39 Tambov Reg. 3,04 3  84 Ingush Republic 5,57 4 
40 Vladimir Reg. 3,04 3  85 Evenki A.T.  5,79 4 
41 Stavropol Territory 3,10 3  86 Amur Reg. 6,53 5 
42 Vologda Reg. 3,11 3  87 Pskov Reg. 6,56 5 
43 Chuvash Republic 3,13 3  88 Maritime (Primorsky) territory 7,45 6 
44 Khakass Republic 3,14 3  89 Chechen Republic 10,00 7 
45  Kaliningrad Reg. 3,18 3      
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4. Indices for Political Risks 
Micro- and Macropolitical Risks 
1. Index: Continuity of the Regional Voter Preferences 
Contents: On the basis of the Russian parliament elections (1993 and 1995) and presidential 
(1996) election (first election tour) the continuity of votes' distribution on the party spectrum is 
studied. To integrate the presidential election, the candidates are related to political parties. 
The KPRF (Communists) stands for Zyuganov, "Our House is Russia" (NDR) for Yeltsin, KRO 
for Lebed and Yabloko for Yavlinskii. The weight of the index is 1. 
Sources: Official election results (Database: Ostnews). 
Procedure: The scale ranges from zero to nine points. The first three winning parties are rated 
independently of their ranking position. All three elections are compared to each other. In each 
comparison the points zero to three are given. Zero points for three equal winning parties, one 
point for two equal parties, two points for one corresponding party, and three points for no 
corresponding winning party. After three comparisons the points are added and the scale 
ranges from zero to nine points. Zero points mean that the three (best) parties in all three 
elections are equal. Nine points show that in each election different parties won the election 
(no winning party of one election is equal to a winning party in another election).  
Results: Looking at the elections in chronological order a high degree of correspondence is 
quite evident. In about one half of the regions two equal parties won the elections. In total 
comparison, however, no region was rated with zero to two points. The two most stable 
regions, the Aginski Buryat A.T. and the Chita Region, got three points. Nine points had been 
given to the Chechen Republic. 
The index reached the weighted mean value 5,4.  
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Figure 4.1: Frequency distribution of the index "Continuity of the regional voter 
preferences" 
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2. Index: Fragmentation of the Regional Political Spectrum 
Content: With the aim of looking for the degree of fragmentation of the regional political 
spectrum, the parliamentary election 1995 is interrogated. The weight of the index is 1. 
Sources: Official election results (Database: Ostnews). 
Procedure: The scale extends from zero to ten points. Zero points reflect only one dominating 
party (at least 50% of valuable votes). Ten points means that there are seven parties or more 
necessary to get 50% of votes.  
Results: The index identifies one region – the North Ossetian Republic – with zero points. Most 
of the regions had been rated with six points (34 regions) and. seven points (26 regions) 
respectively. Therefore, the regional political spectrum is relatively fragmented. In 12 regions 
(one point) the fragmentation is low. Highest fragmentation (eight points) could be found in two 
regions: the Koryak A. T. and the Sverdlovsk Region. 
The index reached the weighted mean value 5,5. 
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Figure 4.2: Frequency distribution of the index "Fragmentation of the political 
spectrum" 
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3. Index: Organisation and Power of the Radical Political Parties 
Content: The index judges the degree of the organisation and power of the radical political par-
ties KPRF (communists) and LDPR (Liberal democrats or Zhirinovskii's party). The weight of 
the index is 0,5. 
Sources: Official election results (Database: Ostnews). 
Procedure: The scale ranges from zero points – the absolute absence of radical parties to – 
ten points, which reflects the great significance of radical parties in the concerned region. The 
index looks at the first three winners respecting the hierarchy. In both parliamentary elections 
the KPRF and LDPR receive two points being winner and one point being second or third 
placed. In the presidential election, which has been less time ago and therefore more 
significant for this study, the KPRF and LDPR get three points being winner and one point 
being second or third. Finally, the three individual results are summed up. 
Results: About one third of all Russian regions (30 regions) had been rated with nine points. 
They are centres of radical parties. 21 regions (23%) rated with six points show radical tenden-
cies. No region got zero or one point, but one region (the Ingush Republic) had two points. The 
end is characterised by the Altai Republic with ten points. In most of the Russian regions the 
radical parties are very well organised. 
The index reached the weighted mean value 6,9. 
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Figure 4.3: Frequency distribution of the index "Organisation of radical political 
parties" 
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4. Index: Presence of the Strong Interest Groups 
Content: In regional economy structures interest groups are composed of regional representa-
tives of oil companies, of so-called financial-industrial groups (holdings), and large civil and de-
fence (state-owned) enterprises. The political force of regional lobbyists can be measured by 
the extent of so-called mixed ownership enterprises with private and state owners under 
participation of the regional administration. The weight of the index is 1. 
Sources: Data is taken from the Russian study "Predprinimatel'skij klimat regionov Rossii" 
(Business climate in the Russian regions) (in the following: RSPP), p. 159, from the journal 
"Russia Review" (July 1997), and the monograph of the Bundesinstitut für ostwissenschaftliche 
und internationale Studien, Zwischen Krise und Konsolidierung, 1995, p. 279. 
Procedure: The index consists of two parts, joint by the mean value. In its first part the score 
looks at the existence of strong economic interest groups. Zero points mean there are no inter-
est groups, and ten points mean that there are more than six strong interest groups in the re-
gion. Existing strong interest is counted. Secondly, their economic power is rated. Zero points 
indicate less than 15% of the total investment is done by "mixed"-ownership. Ten points mean 
that more than 60% of the investment belongs to "mixed" enterprises. In total, ten points stand 
for very strong regional interest groups and zero points for a balanced power mixture. 
Results: The oil centre Tyumen Region got 10 points. There the impact of regional interest 
groups is enormous. Strong lobbyists' impact on regional (economic) decision making could be 
noticed in more than two thirds of the Russian regions (57 regions). In nine regions, most of 
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them autonomy territories, regional interest groups do not unbalance the decision-making 
process. 
The index reached the weighted mean value 3,8. 
Figure 4.4: Frequency distribution of the index "Presence of strong interest groups" 
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5. Index: Legislative Stability and Proper Implementation of Treaties 
Content: The index looks at the legislative stability and the proper implementation a treaties in 
the Russian regions. The entrepreneurial risk of nationalisation (expropriation) belongs to this 
index. The weight of the index is 1. 
Sources: Databases "Ostnews" and "GUStel". 
Procedure: The documented cases of injustice, unfair legal proceedings and trials, and 
bureaucratical ignorance of right and law as well as official declarations about nationalisation 
are counted (1994-1997). The index rates no cases of injustice as an "acceptable" legal 
position for potential investors (zero points). More than 10 documented cases of injustice are a 
prove for a "very bad" legal position (10 points).  
Results: Three regions had good results (zero points). They are the Altai Territory, the Belgorod 
and the Irkutsk Region. In nine regions we notified a very bad situation. Most of them are in the 
northern Caucasian areas and in some areas of the Far East. The majority of the Russian 
regions belongs to the category "limited acceptable". 
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The index reached the weighted mean value 5,3. 
Figure 4.5: Frequency distribution of the index "Legislative stability and proper  
implementation of treaties" 
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6. Index: State-ownership in the Economy 
Contents: The index measures the state-ownership in the economy in terms of national and 
local investment and ownership in the regional economy. The weight of the index is 0,5. 
Sources: Statistics of Goskomstat Rossi: Rossiiskii statisticheskii ezhegodnik 1996 (in the fol-
lowing: Goskomstat) pp. 951 ff. 
Procedures: The statistics show the different types of ownership in Russia. The scale ranges 
from zero to ten points. Zero points reflect a state-ownership below 35%. A state-ownership 
over 90% is rated with ten points. 
Results: 18 regions got zero points. Important economic oil regions as the Bashkortostan 
Republic, the Chelyabinsk Region, the Khanty-Mansi A. T., the Krasnodar Territory, the 
Magadan Region, the Nenetz A. T. as well as Samara, Tomsk and the Tyumen Region came 
under this category. 19 regions had been rated with eight points and additional five regions with 
ten points. Among them are a lot of economically weak agrarian regions. 
The index reached the weighted mean value 3,9. 
Figure 4.6: Frequency distribution of the index "State-ownership in the economy" 
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7. Index: Support of Foreign Trade 
Contents: The index determines the regional support of foreign trade. It looks at the regional 
exportation figures of 1994 and 1995. The weight of the index is 0,5. 
Sources: Statistics of Goskomstat, pp. 898 ff. 
Procedures: The available Russian exportation statistics describe the development in real 
prices. Having a high inflation in Russia these statistics are not comparable. For that reason 
each of the statistics is rated with the scale from zero to five points. Finally, the individual 
results are summed up. Zero points mean high regional exportation and ten points nearly no 
regional exportation.  
Results: Three regions having good exportation potential because of oil and gas resources re-
ceived zero points. It refers to the Khanty-Mansi A. T., the Samara Region and the Tyumen 
Region. In the majority of the Russian regions the exportation potential is much lower. 
Consequently, the support of foreign trade is weaker. More than two thirds of all Russian 
regions had been rated with seven or more points. 35 regions got ten points. Most of them are 
agrarian regions. In total, the support of foreign trade in Russian regions is very low.  
The index reached the weighted mean value 7,6. 
Figure 4.7: Frequency distribution of the index "Support of foreign trade" 
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8. Index: Regional Tax Policy 
Contents: The regional tax policy determines beside the central (federal) tax policy the amount 
of the taxes potential investors have to pay in future. The weight of the index is 0,5. 
Sources: Statistics of RSPP (pp. 268 ff.) and the Database "Ostnews". 
Procedures: The index consists of two parts, of which each had been rated with values from 
zero to ten points. Their mean value was taken to get the result. The first part refers to the 
taxes per capita in the Russian regions of 1996. The regional taxes per capita are related to 
the taxes per capita of Russia in total. The second part of the index shows the regional tax 
policy of 1996 and 1997 and the announced regional measures. The scale of the second part 
ranges from extensive tax abatement (zero points) to extensive tax increase (ten points). The 
scale of the index in total ranges from zero points that mean the local/regional taxes get less 
to ten points if the taxes rise enormously.  
Results: In no Russian region the regional tax policy develops desirably. One reason for that is 
the necessity to balance the regional budget with special taxes and duties. With two points the 
so-called "tax-free-zone" the Ingush Republic came out best. (In the Ingush Republic investors 
have to pay other duties than taxes.) 70 regions got four or five points. So nearly 80% of the 
Russian regions show a more or less stable tax policy. Ten points did not show up. 
The index reached the weighted mean value 4,6. 
Figure 4.8: Frequency distribution of the index "Regional tax policy" 
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Intern and/or Extern Risks  
9. Index: Conflicts at Regional and National Borders 
Contents: Border conflicts are found at regional and national borders as the example of the 
Chechen war showed. The weight of the index is 1. 
Sources: Databases "Ostnews" and "GUStel". 
Procedures: The documented cases of existent and potential border conflicts are counted. The 
scale ranges from "no conflicts" (zero points) to "armed conflicts" (ten points). 
Results: The majority of the Russian regions shows no border conflicts, as 45 regions had 
been rated with zero points. But there are also six regions which had been rated with the 
maximum value of ten points. They are the northern Caucasian republics, the Chechen Re-
public, the Republic Dagestan, the Ingush Republic, the North Ossetian Republic, and the 
Stavropol Territory. There are armed conflicts of guerillas because of the Chechen war. Another 
ten-point region is the Maritime (Primorsky) Territory in the Far East. At the border to China 
dominates sometimes the iron hand especially in the smuggler milieu on both sides of the 
border. 14 regions which have been rated with five points show signs of stirring conflicts. 
The index reached the weighted mean value 2,1. 
Figure 4.9: Frequency distribution of the index "Conflicts at regional and national  
borders" 
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10. Index: Crime Rate 
Contents: The index reflects the development of the crime rate in Russian regions from 1993 to 
1995. The weight of the index is 1. See also table A-1: "Development of the crime rate in 
Russian regions".in the appendix.  
Sources: Statistics of Goskomstat (pp. 850-852). 
Procedure: The statistics show the crime rate per capita in the regions. Regions with no 
criminality are rated with zero points, more than three crimes to 1.000 inhabitants are rated 
with 10 points. 
Results: More than two crimes to 1.000 inhabitants (five points) could be found in 52 regions 
(46%). A statistical problem of Goskomstat is given by the cause that the Ingush Republic 
falsely received zero points. In total, fifteen regions received ten points. Some of them are well-
known for their high crime rate. Ten points received the Chita Region, the Evenki A. T., the 
Jewish A. T., the Kaliningrad Region, the Khabarovsk Region, the Khanti-Mansi A. T., the 
Kurgan Region, the Leningrad Region, the Magadan Region, the Novosibirsk Region, the Perm 
Region, the Maritime (Primorsky) Territory, the Sakhalin Region, the Tomsk Region, and the 
Tuva Republic. 
The index reached the weighted mean value 5,3. 
Figure 4.10: Frequency distribution of the index "Crime rate" 
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11. Index: Intern Security and Military Threat to the Population 
Contents: The index stands for the intern security and military threat for the population as a 
consequence of badly equipped military groups or nuclear, chemical or biological accidents in 
military bases. The weight of the index is 1. 
Sources: Databases "Ostnews" and "GUStel". 
Procedure: The index consists of two parts. The mean value is taken to get the result. The first 
part reflects the belonging to a privileged (zero points) or "normal" (three points) military 
territory. A "normal" one is badly supplied with material and food stuff. In the second part 
extensive military accidents and attacks are rated with ten points. In total zero points mean 
"no intern military danger" and ten points stand for an alarming situation in the army.  
Results: In 20 Russian regions no outstanding military danger to the population (zero points) 
has been noticed. In nearly one half of the regions (43 regions) some signs of potential intern 
security risk (three points) could be found. Only in the Chechen Republic the intern security 
risk is very high (ten points). 
The index reached the weighted mean value 3,2. 
Figure 4.11: Frequency distribution of the index "Intern security and military threat to  
the population" 
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Governmental and Social Risks 
12. Index: Function of the Regional Administration and Transparency of Decision 
Making 
Contents: The function of the regional administration and transparency of decision making is 
demonstrated by the typus of the ruling Russian élite and its mode of operation. The weight of 
the index is 0,5. 
Sources: "Wirtschaftshandbuch Rußland" (edited by the Frankfurter Allgemeinen Zeitung, in 
the following: FAZ) and "Ostnews". 
Procedure: Regional administrations, where members of the new Russian élite define the 
regional political structures are rated with zero points. Regions with pragmatic nomenklatura 
are rated with five points and those with clans dominating the regional governments with ten 
points. 
Results: Transparent decision-making processes could be found in 24 Russian regions (zero 
points). In a little bit more (28 regions), however, clans govern the regional administration (ten 
points). Their decisions seem to be based on arbitrariness and haggling. Pragmatic political 
leaders dominate the regional politics in 37 regions. This pragmatic attitude dominates in 
Russia in total, too (see index 16). 
The index reached the weighted mean value 5,2. 
Figure 4.12: Frequency distribution of the index "Function of the regional 
administration and transparency of decision making" 
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13. Index: Regional Development of Reforms 
Contents: The index rates the reformist behaviour of the regional administration in the privatisa-
tion process. Analyses are based on the so-called large and small privatisation and on the 
housing privatisation. The weight of the index is 0,5. See also table A-2: "Policy of privatisation 
in the Russian regions (1996)" in the appendix. 
Sources: Statistics of RSPP (p. 146).  
Procedure: The data used shows the state of privatisation in each Russian region. The level of 
each type of privatisation is categorised in five classes from "very high" to "very low". A very 
high privatisation level is rated with zero points and very low privatisation with ten points.  
Results: Two regions had been rated with zero points. They are the Buryat Republic and the 
Stavropol Territory. Five Regions range at the end of the privatisation hierarchy (ten points). 
They are all republics as the Bashkortostan Republic, the Chechen Republic, the Republic 
Mordovia, the Sakha (Yakut) Republic and the Tatarstan Republic. In total, the index draws a 
reformfriendly picture in more than half of the Russian regions. 
The index reached the weighted mean value 3,1. 
Figure 4.13: Frequency distribution of the index "Regional development of reforms" 
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14. Index: Support for Foreign Investments 
Content: The index determines the support for foreign investors through the regional administra-
tion. The weight of the index is 1. 
Sources: Statistics of RSPP (p. 160) and FAZ. 
Procedure: The estimation is based on the level of the actual real investment and the number of 
employees in joint-venture enterprises. The regional initiatives to attract foreign investment are 
respected, too. Zero points mean high foreign investment that is more than 2% of the total sum 
of foreign investment in Russia and more than 10.000 employees in working joint ventures. 
Regions with less than 1% of the total investment and less than 5.000 employees in joint 
ventures are rated with ten points. 
Results: In nine regions the regional administration supports foreign investment very well (zero 
points): in the Archangelsk Region, the Komi Republic, the Krasnoyarsk Territory, Moscow 
(city), the Moscow Region, St. Petersburg, the Tomsk Region, the Tver Region, the Tyumen 
Region. More than half of the Russian regions (49 regions) do not support foreign investment 
(ten points). In total, the political interest for foreign investment is reserved – in spite of the 
political speeches. 
The index reached the weighted mean value 7,2. 
Figure 4.14: Frequency distribution of the index "Support for foreign investments" 
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15. Index: Relation of the Local Administration to the Federal Authorities 
Contents: The index rates the relationship between the local administration to the federal 
authorities, which plays an important role for the possible political activities of the regional 
administrations. The weight of the index is 0,5. 
Sources: Schneider, E.: Föderalismus in Rußland, RSPP (p. 127), FAZ. 
Procedure: The index consists of three parts, whose mean value determines the index. The 
first part looks at the financial assistance for the regional administrations out of the state 
budget. The financial assistance in the Russian Federation is spread out as recognition of the 
loyalty to the central government. Its economic aspect is secondary. High increase of financial 
assistance is rated with zero points, strong decrease with ten points. The second part of the 
index reflects the regional support in the president's election campaign. Obvious support is 
rated with zero points, no support with ten points. Lastly the power-sharing agreements 
between the region and the central government are rated with zero points. In total the scale 
ranges from zero points (very good relationship) to ten points (very bad relationship). 
Results: No extrema – zero and ten points – have been found. Half of the Russian regions are 
settled between four and six points. Their relationship to the central government is 
characterised by different disagreements especially in the case of regional self-determination. 
The index reached the weighted mean value 4,4. 
Figure 4.15: Frequency distribution of the index "Relation of the local administration 
to the Federal authorities" 
0
5
1 0
1 5
2 0
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 0
 
 
22 — Mögel / Political Risk in Russian Regions — I H S 
 
16. Index: Economic and Social Orientation of the Regional Governor 
Contents: The index reflects the economic and social orientation of the regional governor. The 
weight of the index is 1. 
Sources: Schneider, E.: Föderalismus in Rußland, FAZ, and the Database "Ostnews". 
Procedures: Included are the actual governors of 1996/97 and their economic orientation. The 
scale ranges from market orientation (zero points) to a traditional, Soviet style orientation (ten 
points). 
Results: Market-orientated governors could be found in the Kaliningrad Region and the 
Leningrad Region (zero points). In seven regions – rated with ten points – the traditional style 
dominates. Among them are the Chechen Republic, the Kursk Region, the Novgorod Region, 
the Smolensk Region, the Tula Region, and the Yaroslavl Region. A special case is presented 
by the governor of the Pskov Region at the Estonian border, who is a member of the nationalist 
chauvinist party LDPR. Most of the governors unify elements of a market-oriented and a Soviet 
style (see index 12). 
The index reached the weighted mean value 5,9. 
Figure 4.16: Frequency distribution of the index "Economic and social orientation of 
the regional governor" 
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17. Index: State Intervention in Economy 
Content: The index give information about the state intervention in economy. The weight of the 
index is 1. 
Sources: Statistics of RSPP (pp. 131 ff.). 
Procedure: An example of state intervention in regional economic processes are price regula-
tions of goods, services, and food. The statistics used figure out the level of price regulations in 
each region. For this index zero points mean less than 10% of prices are regulated, ten points 
mean there are more than 25% of prices regulated. 
Results: In 20% of the Russian regions (18 regions) there is no considerable state intervention 
in economy (zero points). In most of the regions (32 regions) state intervention is acceptable 
(two points). But seven regional economies are dominated by state activities (ten points). This 
is the case in the Amur Region, the Bashkortostan Republic, the Chechen Republic, the 
Astrachan Region, the Mordovian Republic, the Orlov Region, and the Pskov Region. In total, 
state intervention is moderate for a former socialist country. 
The index reached the weighted mean value 3,8. 
Figure 4.17: Frequency distribution of the index "State intervention in economy" 
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18. Index: Social Situation 
Contents: The index determines the social situation in the Russian regions by the situation in 
the regional labour market, especially by strikes and by the number of households using 
running water. The weight of the index is 0,5. 
Sources: Statistics of Goskomstat (pp. 774 ff.), Russia-1995 (4) (pp. 129 ff.), and RSPP 
(pp. 265 ff.) 
Procedure: The index consists of three parts. To calculate the index the mean value has been 
taken. The three parts reflect the situation on the regional labour market in September 1995 
(accidential), the number of strikes in 1996, and the number of urban households using running 
water. Zero points mean a very good social situation and ten points reflect a threat of social ex-
plosion.  
Results: In two regions the social situation is very good (zero points), in the city of Moscow 
and the Taymyr A. T. In more than half of the Russian regions (50 regions) – rated with four or 
five points – the social situation is rather acceptable. Massive social tensions, however, could 
be found in nine regions, where the political and economic development is in danger. They are 
the Aginski Buryat A. T., the Chechen Republic, the Evenki A. T., the Ivanovo Region, the 
Kalmyk Republic, the Komi-Permyak A. T., the Koryak A. T., the Nenetz A. T., and the Ust'-
Orda Buryat A. T. 
The index reached the weighted mean value 5,4. 
Figure 4.18: Frequency distribution of the index "Social situation" 
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19. Index: Assessment of the Regional Mentality towards Foreigners 
Contents: The index names the assessment of the regional mentality towards foreigners as 
well as the integration of minorities. The weight of the index is 0,5. 
Sources: Götz, R./Halbach, U.: Politisches Lexikon Rußland, and FAZ. 
Procedure: The topics of this index are ethnical fragmentation, regional minority politics, and 
ethnical conflicts in the Russian regions. The scale ranges form zero to ten points, where zero 
points show that the dominant and other ethnic groups live peacefully together. Ten points are 
given to a violent nationalism in the region. 
Results: More then half of the regions (46 regions) belong to the best category (zero points). 
The Chechen Republic marks the end with ten points. A difficult situation could be found in the 
Bashkortostan Republic (8 points) and in the Maritime (Primorsky) Territory (seven points). In 
seven regions the chauvinism is a political fact. In 32 regions, rated with three points, 
nationalism does not dominate but the potential for xenophobia exists.  
The index reached the weighted mean value 1,9. 
Figure 4.19: Frequency distribution of the index "Assessment of the regional mentality 
towards foreigners" 
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Appendix 
Table A-1: Development of the crime rate in Russian regions (1993–1995) 
     (Number of crimes per 1.000 inhabitants)  
Regions 1993 1994 1995  Regions 1993 1994 1995 
Russian Federation in 
total 
1,9 1,8 1,9  Mariy El Republic 1,7 1,7 2,1 
Adygei Republic 1,4 1,4 1,3  Moscow 0,9 1,0 1,1 
Aginski Buryat A.T. 1,7 1,7 1,8  Moscow Reg. 1,2 1,1 1,2 
Altai Republic 2,1 2,1 2,2  Murmansk Reg. 1,7 1,4 1,4 
Altai Territory 1,8 1,6 1,8  Nenetz A.T. 1,7 1,8 1,9 
Amur Reg. 2,0 2,0 2,0  Nizhny Novgorod Reg. 2,0 1,8 1,8 
Arkhangelsk Reg. 2,2 2,4 2,4  North Ossetian Republic 1,2 1,0 1,0 
Astrakhan Reg. 1,9 1,7 1,9  Novgorod Reg. 2,3 2,1 2,4 
Bashkortostan Republic 1,1 1,1 1,1  Novosibirsk Reg. 3,1 2,6 2,7 
Belgorod Reg. 1,2 1,1 1,1  Omsk Reg. 2,4 2,3 2,3 
Bryansk Reg. 1,8 1,9 2,0  Orel Reg. 1,3 1,3 1,3 
Buryat Republic 2,3 2,2 2,6  Orenburg Reg. 1,3 1,4 1,5 
Chechen Republic 3,0 3,0 0,6  Penza Reg. 1,1 1,1 1,1 
Chelyabinsk Reg. 1,8 1,8 2,0  Perm Reg. 2,4 2,4 2,7 
Chita Reg. 2,3 2,4 2,8  Pskov Reg. 2,7 2,2 2,5 
Chukot A.T. 1,1 1,3 1,2  Republic Dagestan 0,9 0,7 0,7 
Chuvash Republic 1,5 1,5 1,7  Republic Karelia 2,7 2,3 2,3 
Evenki A.T. 2,8 2,8 2,0  Republic Mordovia 1,7 1,7 1,8 
Ingush Republic 0,4 0,4 0,4  Rostov Reg. 1,6 1,4 1,5 
Irkutsk Reg. 2,3 2,2 2,3  Ryazan Reg. 1,4 1,3 1,5 
Ivanovo Reg. 1,7 1,6 2,0  Sakha (Yakut) Republic 1,7 1,5 1,5 
Jewish A.R. 2,4 2,7 3,3  Sakhalin Reg. 3,2 3,4 3,6 
Kabardino-Balkar 
Republic 
1,0 0,9 0,9  Samara Reg. 1,5 1,5 1,5 
Kaliningrad Reg. 2,6 2,4 2,5  Saratov Reg. 1,6 1,5 1,6 
Kalmyk Republic 1,4 1,3 1,4  Smolensk Reg. 2,0 1,9 2,1 
Kaluga Reg. 1,5 1,4 1,6  St.Petersburg 2,5 2,2 2,1 
Kamchatka Reg. 2,1 2,0 2,1  Stavropol Territory 1,4 1,3 1,3 
Karachai-Cherkess Rep. 1,1 0,9 0,9  Sverdlovsk Reg. 2,3 2,3 2,5 
Kemerovo Reg. 1,6 1,5 1,6  Tambov Reg. 1,4 1,6 1,6 
Khabarovsk Territory 3,0 2,8 2,9  Tatarstan Republic 1,7 1,7 1,6 
Khakass Republic 2,2 2,0 2,2  Taymyr A.T. 1,3 1,3 1,4 
Khanty-Mansi A.T. 2,7 2,7 2,6  Tomsk Reg. 3,2 2,6 2,6 
Kirov Reg. 1,7 1,7 1,8  Tula Reg. 1,7 1,7 1,8 
Komi-Permyak A.T. 1,9 1,9 2,3  Tuva Republic 3,2 2,8 2,8 
Komi Republic 1,8 1,7 1,8  Tver Reg. 2,1 2,1 2,1 
Koryak A.T. 2,0 2,0 1,9  Tyumen Reg. 2,3 2,4 2,5 
Kostroma Reg. 1,5 1,4 1,6  Udmurt Republic 1,9 1,8 1,9 
Krasnodar Territory 1,7 1,6 1,6  Ulyanovsk Reg. 1,2 1,1 1,2 
Krasnoyarsk Territory 2,3 2,2 2,4  Ust'-Orda Buryat A.T. 1,6 1,6 1,8 
Kurgan Reg. 2,6 2,4 2,7  Vladimir Reg. 1,7 1,6 1,8 
Kursk Reg. 1,5 1,7 1,8  Volgograd Reg. 1,5 1,4 1,4 
Leningrad Reg. 3,0 2,5 2,5  Vologda Reg. 1,9 1,9 2,0 
Lipetsk Reg. 1,4 1,4 1,4  Voronezh Reg. 1,1 1,2 1,3 
Magadan Reg. 2,6 2,6 3,1  Yamalo-Nenetz A.T. 1,6 1,6 1,6 
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Maritime (Primorsky) Terr. 3,4 3,2 3,1  Yaroslavl Reg. 2 1,8 2,1 
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Table A-2: Policy of privatisation in the Russian regions (1996) 
Categories: very high level (1), high level (2), average level (3), low level (4), very low level (5) 
Privatisation:  A = Large Privatisation2 C = Housing Privatisation B = Small Privatisation3 
 
Regions A B C  Regions A B C 
Adygei Republic 3 3 2  Moscow  4 1 2 
Aginski Buryat A.T.  2 2 3  Moscow Reg. 4 1 4 
Altai Republic 2 1 1  Murmansk Reg. 4 4 3 
Altai Territory 2 3 1  Nenetz A.T.  2 2 5 
Amur Reg. 3 3 3  Nizhny Novgorod Reg. 3 1 3 
Arkhangelsk Reg. 2 2 5  North Ossetian Republic 5 5 1 
Astrakhan Reg. 3 4 2  Novgorod Reg. 3 3 3 
Bashkortostan Republic 5 5 5  Novosibirsk Reg. 3 3 2 
Belgorod Reg. 1 2 3  Omsk Reg. 2 3 1 
Bryansk Reg. 3 4 3  Orel Reg. 1 3 3 
Buryat Republic 1 2 2  Orenburg Reg. 1 3 3 
Chechen Republic 5 5 5  Penza Reg. 3 2 2 
Chelyabinsk Reg. 2 3 2  Perm Reg. 4 3 4 
Chita Reg. 2 2 3  Pskov Reg. 3 3 3 
Chukot A.T.  4 4 4  Republic Dagestan 5 4 2 
Chuvash Republic 3 4 5  Republic Karelia 3 4 4 
Evenki A.T.  3 4 3  Republic Mordovia 5 5 5 
Ingush Republic 4 5 5  Rostov Reg. 2 1 1 
Irkutsk Reg. 3 4 3  Ryazan Reg. 1 1 3 
Ivanovo Reg. 3 3 3  Sakha (Yakut) Republic 5 5 5 
Jewish A.R. 3 3 3  Sakhalin Reg. 1 2 4 
Kabardino-Balkar Republic 5 5 1  Samara Reg. 3 1 4 
Kaliningrad Reg. 3 4 3  Saratov Reg. 1 1 3 
Kalmyk Republic 4 4 1  Smolensk Reg. 2 3 2 
Kaluga Reg. 2 2 2  St.Petersburg 2 1 4 
Kamchatka Reg. 3 3 3  Stavropol Territory 1 3 1 
Karachai-Cherkess Rep. 4 4 1  Sverdlovsk Reg. 3 4 2 
Kemerovo Reg. 3 3 2  Tambov Reg. 3 3 3 
Khabarovsk Territory 3 1 3  Tatarstan Republic 5 4 4 
Khakass Republic 2 1 2  Taymyr A.T.  3 4 3 
Khanty-Mansi A.T.  3 4 3  Tomsk Reg. 2 4 4 
Kirov Reg. 3 4 4  Tula Reg. 3 2 2 
Komi-Permyak A.T.  4 3 4  Tuva Republic 5 4 2 
Komi Republic 3 4 4  Tver Reg. 3 3 2 
Koryak A.T.  3 3 3  Tyumen Reg. 3 4 3 
Kostroma Reg. 3 3 3  Udmurt Republic 3 2 4 
Krasnodar Territory 4 3 2  Ulyanovsk Reg. 3 5 5 
Krasnoyarsk Territory 3 4 3  Ust'-Orda Buryat A.T.  3 4 3 
Kurgan Reg. 2 2 2  Vladimir Reg. 4 4 3 
Kursk Reg. 2 3 3  Volgograd Reg. 2 3 2 
Leningrad Reg. 4 3 4  Vologda Reg. 1 2 4 
Lipetsk Reg. 2 4 3  Voronezh Reg. 2 3 3 
Magadan Reg. 3 2 4  Yamalo-Nenetz A.T.  3 4 3 
Maritime (Primorsky) Terr. 2 3 3  Yaroslavl Reg. 3 3 3 
                                                                                                                                                                                        
2 Privatisation of the former Moscow managed, state owned enterprises. 
3 Privatisation of former regionally managed enterprises, shops etc. 
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Mariy El Republic 3 5 3      
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Table A-3: Overview of all regions and indices 
Indices of the political risk rating 
 
 
 
 
 
Indices 
Conti-
nuity  
of the  
regional 
voter 
prefer-
ences 
Frag-
menta-
tion  
of the 
regional 
political 
spec-
trum 
Organi-
sation 
and 
power 
of the 
radical 
political  
parties 
Pre-
sence 
of the 
strong 
interest 
groups 
Legisla-
tive  
stability 
and 
proper 
imple-
mentation 
of 
treaties 
State-
owner-
ship  
in the 
economy  
Support 
of  
foreign 
trade 
Regio-
nal  
tax 
policy 
Conflicts 
at  
regional 
and 
national 
borders 
Crime 
rate 
Intern 
securit
y and 
military 
threat 
to the 
popula-
tion 
Function 
of the 
regional 
admini-
stration 
and 
transpar-
ency of 
decision 
making 
Regional 
develop-
ment  
of 
reforms  
Support 
for 
foreign 
invest-
ments 
Relation 
of the 
local 
admini-
stration 
to the 
Federal 
authori-
ties 
Econo-
mic  
and 
social 
orienta-
tion  
of the 
regional 
gover-
nor 
State 
inter-
vention 
in eco-
nomy 
Social 
situa-
tion 
Assess-
ment  
of the  
regional 
mentality 
towards  
foreig-
ners 
Weight of the 
indices 
1 1 0,5 1 1 0,5 0,5 0,5 1 1 1 1 0,5 1 0,5 1 1 0,5 0,5 
Order number 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 
Alphabetical order of  the regions  
Adygei Republic 5 1 9 2 7 5 10 5 0 3 0 5 3 10 3 5 0 8 3 
Aginski Buryat A.T.  3 1 6 5 3 2 10 4 0 5 3 10 1 10 7 5 5 10 3 
Altai Republic 7 6 7 0 3 8 10 4 2 5 7 10 1 10 2 5 0 5 3 
Altai Territory 5 5 9 2 0 5 9 1 2 5 3 5 1 5 2 8 5 3 3 
Amur Reg. 5 5 9 5 10 2 10 8 5 5 5 10 3 10 1 5 10 7 0 
Arkhangelsk Reg. 6 7 6 5 3 2 6 4 0 5 7 5 3 0 4 5 2 7 0 
Astrakhan Reg. 4 5 9 8 3 0 10 6 2 5 0 5 3 5 4 5 10 3 5 
Bashkortostan  
  Republic 
5 5 8 5 7 0 2 6 0 3 4 10 10 5 5 5 10 3 8 
Belgorod Reg. 4 4 9 5 0 0 6 3 5 3 0 0 1 10 3 8 5 5 0 
Bryansk Reg. 4 1 9 2 10 8 10 6 5 5 3 10 3 10 2 8 5 7 0 
Buryat Republic 5 6 8 5 7 8 10 6 2 5 7 5 0 10 5 8 5 8 3 
Chechen Republic 9 1 5 0 10 10 10 5 10 5 10 10 10 10 9 10 10 10 10 
Chelyabinsk Reg. 6 7 5 8 7 0 1 8 5 5 7 5 1 10 4 8 5 3 0 
Chita Reg. 3 6 10 8 7 2 10 8 2 10 3 5 1 10 4 5 5 8 3 
Chukot A.T.  6 7 5 0 7 10 10 4 2 3 0 10 6 10 8 5 8 3 3 
Chuvash Republic 5 3 9 2 7 5 10 5 5 5 3 0 6 10 3 5 8 5 3 
Evenki A.T.  6 7 6 0 7 10 10 4 0 10 3 10 3 10 7 5 2 10 3 
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Ingush Republic 7 1 2 0 3 10 10 2 10 0 5 10 6 10 2 8 8 5 5 
Irkutsk Reg. 6 7 6 5 0 5 2 3 0 5 3 0 2 10 5 3 8 7 3 
Ivanovo Reg. 7 6 6 8 3 0 10 6 0 5 7 5 2 10 1 5 5 10 0 
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Jewish A.R. 7 6 8 0 3 8 10 2 2 10 5 5 3 2 4 3 2 8 3 
Kabardino-Balkar 
  Republic 
5 5 4 2 7 8 10 5 0 3 3 5 6 10 1 5 5 8 3 
Kaliningrad Reg. 4 7 7 5 7 5 8 6 5 10 7 0 2 5 5 0 2 2 0 
Kalmyk Republic 5 5 5 2 7 8 10 5 0 3 0 0 3 10 4 5 0 10 3 
Kaluga Reg. 4 6 9 2 3 8 10 3 0 5 0 5 1 10 2 8 8 5 0 
Kamchatka Reg. 4 6 5 4 7 8 8 5 6 5 3 2 2 5 7 3 0 2 0 
Karachai-Cherkess  
  Republic 
5 1 8 10 3 0 10 7 2 3 3 10 3 10 2 5 8 5 3 
Kemerovo Reg. 7 1 8 10 3 0 1 7 0 5 4 10 2 5 2 5 2 3 0 
Khabarovsk Territory 7 7 6 5 10 5 6 8 5 10 5 0 3 5 5 5 8 3 0 
Khakass Republic 5 7 9 5 3 5 8 4 0 5 3 5 1 10 2 8 2 5 3 
Khanty-Mansi A.T.  7 7 4 10 3 0 0 7 0 10 3 10 3 5 6 5 0 5 3 
Kirov Reg. 7 6 6 5 7 5 9 6 0 5 3 5 2 10 6 8 2 5 0 
Komi-Permyak A.T.  4 6 7 0 7 8 10 4 0 5 3 10 6 10 5 5 2 10 3 
Komi Republic 6 6 6 8 7 2 8 8 0 5 7 0 3 0 2 8 0 3 5 
Koryak A.T.  7 8 6 0 3 8 10 2 2 5 0 10 3 10 8 3 0 10 3 
Kostroma Reg. 6 7 8 2 3 8 10 3 0 5 3 0 2 5 2 8 2 7 0 
Krasnodar Territory 4 5 9 5 7 0 9 6 2 5 0 5 2 5 3 8 8 5 5 
Krasnoyarsk Territory 6 7 6 5 7 8 1 6 0 5 7 0 2 0 4 8 2 3 0 
Kurgan Reg. 5 6 9 5 3 2 10 4 0 10 3 5 1 10 4 8 2 8 0 
Kursk Reg. 5 1 8 2 10 5 9 6 2 5 0 10 1 10 3 10 8 3 0 
34 — Mögel / Political Risk in Russian Regions — I H S 
 
 
Leningrad Reg. 6 7 5 2 3 8 7 3 5 10 0 0 6 5 2 0 2 7 0 
Lipetsk Reg. 5 6 9 10 7 0 4 9 0 3 3 0 1 5 4 5 2 3 0 
Magadan Reg. 6 6 6 10 3 0 10 7 2 10 0 0 3 5 6 3 2 3 0 
Maritime (Primorsky)  
  territory 
7 6 6 8 10 2 5 9 10 10 5 10 1 6 8 8 2 3 7 
Mariy El Republic 5 6 9 5 3 5 9 4 2 5 3 5 3 5 9 8 2 5 3 
Moscow  6 6 3 8 3 2 7 6 0 3 0 5 3 0 1 3 0 0 0 
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Moscow Reg. 5 6 6 5 3 2 6 4 0 3 3 5 2 0 4 8 2 3 0 
Murmansk Reg. 6 7 6 8 3 2 6 6 2 5 7 5 2 10 6 5 2 3 0 
Nenetz A.T.  7 7 5 10 3 0 10 7 0 5 3 0 3 10 5 3 2 10 3 
Nizhny Novgorod Reg. 6 6 6 5 3 2 5 4 0 5 3 0 3 5 2 3 5 3 0 
North Ossetian  
  Republic 
4 0 9 2 3 8 10 3 10 3 3 10 6 10 1 5 0 3 5 
Novgorod Reg. 6 7 6 2 3 2 8 3 0 5 0 5 3 5 7 10 2 5 0 
Novosibirsk Reg. 5 6 8 2 3 8 9 3 2 10 3 5 3 5 4 5 2 5 0 
Omsk Reg. 5 7 9 5 10 2 6 8 5 5 3 0 1 10 3 3 2 3 0 
Orel Reg. 4 6 9 5 3 5 5 4 5 3 3 5 1 5 2 5 8 5 0 
Orenburg Reg. 4 1 9 5 7 2 8 6 0 3 3 5 1 10 3 5 10 8 0 
Penza Reg. 5 3 9 5 3 8 10 4 0 3 7 10 3 10 2 5 5 7 0 
Perm Reg. 6 7 5 5 7 2 4 6 0 10 3 10 6 10 2 3 2 5 0 
Pskov Reg. 4 6 9 2 7 5 10 5 5 5 0 10 3 10 9 10 10 7 0 
Republic Dagestan 5 1 7 2 10 5 10 6 10 3 5 5 6 10 3 8 0 5 5 
Republic Karelia 6 7 5 5 3 2 7 4 2 5 3 0 3 5 7 5 2 5 3 
Republic Mordovia 4 5 9 5 7 2 10 6 0 5 3 5 10 10 7 5 10 5 3 
Rostov Reg. 5 5 9 5 7 2 8 6 5 5 5 5 1 10 2 5 8 5 3 
Ryazan Reg. 4 6 9 5 3 5 8 4 0 3 5 5 1 10 5 8 0 3 0 
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Sakha (Yakut) 
Republic 
7 7 5 5 7 5 7 6 0 5 7 5 10 10 7 5 8 3 3 
Sakhalin Reg. 7 6 6 5 3 2 8 4 5 10 5 5 1 10 3 5 0 8 0 
Samara Reg. 4 6 7 8 7 0 0 8 0 5 3 0 3 5 3 3 0 3 0 
Saratov Reg. 4 5 9 5 7 2 8 6 5 5 3 0 1 10 3 3 5 5 0 
Smolensk Reg. 4 1 9 2 7 5 7 5 2 5 0 5 1 10 1 10 5 5 0 
St.Petersburg 4 6 3 2 7 8 8 5 0 5 3 0 3 0 3 3 5 3 0 
Stavropol Territory 4 5 9 2 7 2 8 5 10 3 3 5 0 5 2 8 5 3 5 
Sverdlovsk Reg. 7 8 3 5 7 5 3 6 0 5 3 0 3 5 2 3 2 3 0 
Tambov Reg. 5 1 9 2 3 2 10 3 0 5 3 10 3 10 4 8 2 8 0 
 
 
 
 
Indices 
Conti-
nuity  
of the  
regional 
voter 
prefer-
ences 
Frag-
menta-
tion  
of the 
regional 
political 
spec-
trum 
Organi-
sation 
and 
power 
of the 
radical 
political  
parties 
Pre-
sence 
of the 
strong 
interest 
groups 
Legisla-
tive  
stability 
and 
proper 
imple-
mentation 
of 
treaties 
State-
owner-
ship  
in the 
economy  
Support 
of 
foreign 
trade 
Regio-
nal  
tax 
policy 
Conflicts 
at  
regional 
and 
national 
borders 
Crime 
rate 
Intern 
securit
y and 
military 
threat 
to the 
popula-
tion 
Function 
of the 
regional 
admini-
stration 
and 
transpar-
ency of 
decision 
making 
Regional 
develop-
ment  
of 
reforms  
Support 
for 
foreign 
invest-
ments 
Relation 
of the 
local 
admini-
stration 
to the 
Federal 
authori-
ties 
Econo-
mic  
and 
social 
orienta-
tion  
of the 
regional 
gover-
nor 
State 
inter-
vention 
in eco-
nomy 
Social 
situa-
tion 
Assess-
ment  
of the  
regional 
mentality 
towards  
foreig-
ners 
Tatarstan Republic 7 5 5 8 7 2 5 8 2 5 3 0 10 5 4 5 2 3 5 
Taymyr A.T.  7 7 4 0 7 10 10 4 0 3 3 10 3 10 8 5 2 0 3 
Tomsk Reg. 6 7 5 8 3 0 7 6 0 10 7 5 3 0 4 5 0 3 3 
Tula Reg. 4 6 9 5 3 5 6 4 0 5 0 10 3 5 5 10 2 3 0 
Tuva Republic 7 5 3 2 7 8 10 5 2 10 3 0 6 10 4 5 0 8 3 
Tver Reg. 4 6 8 0 3 8 10 2 0 5 0 5 3 0 3 8 0 5 0 
Tyumen Reg. 7 7 6 10 3 0 0 7 2 5 7 10 3 0 5 3 0 3 3 
Udmurt Republic 6 7 6 5 7 2 8 6 2 5 5 10 3 5 3 8 5 5 3 
Ulyanovsk Reg. 5 3 9 5 10 2 9 8 0 3 3 10 6 10 6 8 5 3 0 
Ust'-Orda Buryat A.T.  7 5 7 5 7 2 10 6 0 5 3 0 3 10 3 3 8 10 3 
Vladimir Reg. 6 6 6 8 7 0 9 8 0 5 0 5 6 5 3 8 2 3 0 
Volgograd Reg. 4 5 9 5 3 2 6 4 2 3 0 10 1 5 3 8 5 5 3 
Vologda Reg. 6 7 6 8 3 0 1 6 0 5 3 0 1 10 4 8 2 3 0 
Voronezh Reg. 4 6 9 5 3 5 8 4 5 3 0 5 1 10 4 8 2 5 0 
Yamalo-Nenetz A.T.  7 6 4 10 3 2 8 7 0 5 3 10 3 10 5 5 0 5 3 
Yaroslavl Reg. 7 7 5 5 7 0 7 6 0 5 3 5 3 5 4 10 8 5 0 
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Table A-4: Euclidean score (alphabetical order) 
Regional 
ID# 
Region Name Euclidean 
Score 
Ranking for 
Euclidean 
Score 
Histogra
m 
Classifica
tion 
Concentra-
tion Class-
ification 
Position 
1 Adygei Rep. 1,520 12 2 3 78 
2 Aginski Buryat A.T. 2,943 36 3 3 54 
3 Altai Rep. 4,186 61 3 4 29 
4 Altai Territory 1,111 9 1 2 81 
5 Amur Reg. 6,531 86 5 5 4 
6 Arkhangelsk Reg. 1,511 10 2 3 80 
7 Astrakhan Reg. 2,859 34 3 3 56 
8 Bashkortostan Rep. 4,202 62 3 4 28 
9 Belgorod Reg. 1,645 13 2 3 77 
10 Bryansk Reg. 5,075 77 4 4 13 
11 Buryat Rep. 4,883 74 4 4 16 
12 Chechen Rep. 10,000 89 7 7 1 
13 Chelyabinsk Reg. 5,330 81 4 4 9 
14 Chita Reg. 5,090 78 4 4 12 
15 Chukot A.T. 5,142 79 4 4 11 
16 Chuvash Rep. 3,132 43 3 3 47 
17 Evenki A.T. 5,794 85 5 4 5 
18 Ingush Rep. 5,569 84 4 4 6 
19 Irkutsk Reg. 2,660 28 2 3 62 
20 Ivanovo Reg. 4,373 66 4 4 24 
21 Jewish A.R. 1,511 11 2 3 79 
22 Kabardino-Balkar Rep. 2,675 30 2 3 60 
23 Kaliningrad Reg. 3,181 45 3 3 45 
24 Kalmyk Rep. 1,855 17 2 3 73 
25 Kaluga Reg. 3,335 48 3 3 42 
26 Kamchatka Reg. 0,185 4 1 1 86 
27 Karachai-Cherkess Rep. 4,518 69 4 4 21 
28 Kemerovo Reg. 2,766 31 2 3 59 
29 Khabarovsk Territory 5,351 82 4 4 8 
30 Khakass Rep. 3,138 44 3 3 46 
31 Khanty-Mansi A.T. 4,868 73 4 4 17 
32 Kirov Reg. 3,983 57 3 4 33 
33 Komi-Permyak A.T. 4,090 58 3 4 32 
34 Komi Rep. 2,884 35 3 3 55 
35 Koryak A.T. 4,343 65 4 4 25 
36 Kostroma Reg. 1,666 15 2 3 75 
37 Krasnodar Territory 2,857 33 2 3 57 
38 Krasnoyarsk Territory 2,440 25 2 3 65 
39 Kurgan Reg. 4,166 60 3 4 30 
40 Kursk Reg. 5,430 83 4 4 7 
41 Leningrad Reg. 1,880 18 2 3 72 
42 Lipetsk Reg. 2,165 21 2 3 69 
43 Magadan Reg. 2,993 37 3 3 53 
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44 Mariy El Rep. 2,161 20 2 3 70 
38 — Mögel / Political Risk in Russian Regions — I H S 
 
 
Cont. Table A-4: Euclidean score (alphabetical order): 
Regional 
ID# 
Region Name 
Euclidean 
Score 
Ranking for 
Euclidean 
Score 
Histogra
m 
Classifi -
cation 
Concentra-
tion Class-
ification 
Position 
45 Maritime (Primorsky) Territory 7,454 88 6 6 2 
46 Moscow 0,000 1 1 1 89 
47 Moscow Reg. 0,364 5 1 1 85 
48 Murmansk Reg. 3,806 53 3 4 37 
49 Nenetz A.T. 3,896 56 3 4 34 
50 Nizhny Novgorod Reg. 0,175 3 1 1 87 
51 North Ossetian Rep. 3,616 49 3 4 41 
52 Novgorod Reg. 2,175 22 2 3 68 
53 Novosibirsk Reg. 2,095 19 2 3 71 
54 Omsk Reg. 3,648 50 3 4 40 
55 Orel Reg. 1,703 16 2 3 74 
56 Orenburg Reg. 3,212 46 3 3 44 
57 Penza Reg. 3,782 52 3 4 38 
58 Perm Reg. 5,000 75 4 4 15 
59 Pskov Reg. 6,556 87 5 5 3 
60 Rep. Dagestan 4,763 71 4 4 19 
61 Rep. Karelia 0,990 8 1 2 82 
62 Rep. Mordovia 4,549 70 4 4 20 
63 Rostov Reg. 4,106 59 3 4 31 
64 Ryazan Reg. 2,587 27 2 3 63 
65 Sakha (Yakut) Rep. 5,315 80 4 4 10 
66 Sakhalin Reg. 4,240 63 3 4 27 
67 Samara Reg. 0,971 7 1 2 83 
68 Saratov Reg. 2,471 26 2 3 64 
69 Smolensk Reg. 2,839 32 2 3 58 
70 St.Petersburg 0,008 2 1 1 88 
71 Stavropol Territory 3,102 41 3 3 49 
72 Sverdlovsk Reg. 1,645 14 2 3 76 
73 Tambov Reg. 3,043 39 3 3 51 
74 Tatarstan Rep. 2,354 24 2 3 66 
75 Taymyr A.T. 4,458 68 4 4 22 
76 Tomsk Reg. 3,267 47 3 3 43 
77 Tula Reg. 2,996 38 3 3 52 
78 Tuva Rep. 3,853 55 3 4 35 
79 Tver Reg. 0,447 6 1 1 84 
80 Tyumen Reg. 3,823 54 3 4 36 
81 Udmurt Rep. 4,422 67 4 4 23 
82 Ulyanovsk Reg. 5,063 76 4 4 14 
83 Ust'-Orda Buryat A.T. 3,684 51 3 4 39 
84 Vladimir Reg. 3,044 40 3 3 50 
85 Volgograd Reg. 2,194 23 2 3 67 
86 Vologda Reg. 3,107 42 3 3 48 
87 Voronezh Reg. 2,670 29 2 3 61 
88 Yamalo-Nenetz A.T. 4,777 72 4 4 18 
89 Yaroslavl Reg. 4,260 64 3 4 26 
 
